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We document geographic concentration by both venture capital firms and venture capital-financed
companies in three cities – San Francisco, Boston, and New York.  We find that firms open new satellite
offices based on the success rate of venture capital-backed investments in an area.  Geography is also
significantly related to outcomes.  Venture capital firms based in locales that are venture capital centers
outperform, regardless of the stage of the investment.  Ironically, this outperformance arises from outsized
performance outside of the venture capital firms’ office locations, including in peripheral locations.
If the goal of state and local policy makers is to encourage venture capital investment, outperformance
of non-local investments suggests that policy makers might want to mitigate costs associated with
established venture capitalists investing in their geographies rather than encouraging the establishment
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From Silicon Valley to Herzliya, Israel, venture capital firms are concentrated in very 
few locations.  More than half of the 1,000 venture capital offices listed in Pratt’s Guide to 
Private Equity and Venture Capital Sources are located in just three metropolitan areas – San 
Francisco, Boston, and New York.  More than 49% of the U.S.-based companies financed by 
venture capital firms are located in these same three cities.  This paper examines the location 
decisions of venture capital firms and the impact that venture capital firm geography has on 
investments and outcomes.   
The location of venture capital firms matters for the development of entrepreneurial firms 
because venture capitalists provide more than just risk capital.  Venture capital firms typically 
invest in early-stage and high-technology companies where informational asymmetries are high.   
These are firms have highly uncertain future prospects and the potential for agency conflicts are 
severe. Venture capital funding contracts provide for staged financing and venture capitalists are 
constantly evaluating their portfolio companies (see, for example, Sahlman (1990), Gompers 
(1995), and Kaplan and Stromberg (2003)).  Venture capitalists are actively involved in the 
governance of the companies they fund through board membership, management recruiting, and 
the provision of management incentives.  
The cost of providing this oversight is likely to be sensitive to the distance between 
venture capitalists and the firms in which they invest.  The ability to monitor the portfolio 
company, to coach the management team, and to provide introductions may depend upon the 
ability to interact frequently with the company.  For example, Lerner (1995) shows that venture 
capitalists are more likely to serve on the boards of geographically proximate companies.   
Moreover, this involvement is likely to translate into tangible economic progress. Research 3 
 
shows that venture capital-backed companies outperform their peers on many dimensions: i) 
operational growth (Hellmann and Puri (2000)) ii) post-IPO performance (Brav and Gompers 
(1997)) iii) innovation and patenting activity (Kortum and Lerner (2000)) and iv) potential for 
scale (Puri and Zarutskie (2008)).  Similarly, Gompers and Lerner (2001) show that venture 
capital-backed companies have, relative to the amount of capital invested, disproportionately 
contributed to the creation of jobs, market value, and revenues. 
  Reflecting this awareness, states and municipalities are placing increasing emphasis on 
encouraging the establishment of venture capital communities in their regions.  A 2001 National 
Governors Association report stated, “Venture capital is critical to growing the new businesses 
that will drive the ‘new economy.’ Finding ways to nurture the culture of entrepreneurs, and the 
capital that feeds them, must be the top priority of states.”
1  An estimate by the National 
Association of Seed and Venture Funds is that state venture capital funds in 2008 totaled $2.3 
billion
2; meanwhile, an increasing share of the approximately $50 billion that states spend on 
industrial incentives is going to venture-backed firms, a trend that is likely to be accelerated by 
provisions in the recently enacted stimulus bill favoring clean technologies (Engardio (2009)). 
Thus, it is vitally important to understand the geography of venture capital and its association 
with success of the underlying portfolio companies.  
In this paper, we proceed in three steps. First, we document the clustering of venture 
capital in three metropolitan areas (combined statistical areas or CSAs): San Francisco/San Jose, 
Boston, and New York.  We call these cities “venture capital centers.”  There is a long literature 
                                                   
1National Governors Association, Center for Best Practices, “Issue Brief Growing New Businesses with Seed and 
Venture Capital: State Experiences and Options,” 2001, http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/VENCAPITAL.PDF  
(accessed April 11, 2009). 
2 http://www.nasvf.org/nasvf/web.nsf/pages/documents.html/$file/3-24-
08%20Table%20of%20State%20Venture%20Funds%20Distributed%20to%20Response%20Group.pdf (accessed 
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on industrial clustering dating back to Marshall (1920).  Some clustering is to be expected, since 
the forces that are likely to lead to agglomeration economies (input sharing, labor market pooling 
and knowledge spillovers) are likely to be important for venture capital and the types of 
companies in which venture capital firms invest.  We find, however, a level of venture capital 
localization that far exceeds entrepreneurial localization more generally.  Glaeser finds that 
variation in the self-employment rate is related to variation in demography and industry 
concentration, but does not find any correlation between this broad measure of entrepreneurship 
and venture capital. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the number of venture 
capital offices in a region increases venture capital investments in that area by 49.7%.   The C(3) 
ratio of self employment was 10.7%
3, while the comparable C(3) ratio of venture capital partners 
is 60.5%.   
Of course, association does not indicate causation.  The localization of venture capital 
firms that we identify may simply reflect the localization of industries in which venture 
capitalists invest.  But which came first – the venture capitalist or the entrepreneurial company?  
Mollica and Zingales (2007) find evidence that venture capital may have the primary role in 
fostering the entrepreneurial communities in which they are located.  They show that venture 
capital firms increase both patents and the total number of new businesses, using the size of state 
pension funds as an instrument for the number of venture capital firms.   
We examine venture capitalists’ decisions to open offices in new geographies. Instead of 
expanding to regions with few VC firms, VCs tend to open satellite offices in the same three 
cities that are existing centers for venture capital activity.  For example, a Boston-based firm is 
more likely to open a San Francisco/San Jose office than they are an office in Austin, Texas.  In 
                                                   
3 C(3) ratio of self-employment calculated using 2000 micro-level Census data from the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS) at http://usa.ipums.org/usa/.   
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fact, one of the most important determinants of the number of VC offices in a region is the 
success rate for all previous VC investments in that region.   The success rate for previous VC 
investments explains an additional 10.9% of the variance in the number of offices in a region.  
Similarly, the most important determinant of a VC firm’s decision to open a branch office is the 
percentage of its investments (relative to its entire investment portfolio) in that area in the past 
five years. 
Since the relationship between VC firm location and the location of their investments is 
endogenous, we examine the relationship between success and distance from VC investors.  
Overall, venture capital firms based in the venture capital centers outperform even after 
controlling for firm experience.  This may reflect a variety of factors, which are difficult to 
disentangle, including the superior experience of these investors, their greater connections with 
elite limited partners and corporations, and their superior syndication networks (Sorenson and 
Stuart (2001)). 
Surprisingly, much of the VC outperformance in these venture capital centers arises from 
their non-local investments.  This finding is counterintuitive, since venture capitalists might be 
expected to be the most involved and add the most value to the geographically closest 
companies.  We observe this outperformance of non-local companies in both early- and late-
stage investments.  Thus, this wedge in expected returns does not seem to be the result of 
established VC firms’ cherry-picking later-stage enterprises are more likely to successfully exit.  
The higher rates of return on non-local deals may indicate economically meaningful geographic 
differences in the availability of venture capital.  One potential explanation for this higher return 
to non-local deals is that venture capitalists have a higher hurdle rate (i.e., require a higher 6 
 
expected rate of return) for investments that have a higher monitoring cost.  This higher hurdle 
rate may reflect the imputed (personal) cost of traveling to remote locations.   
We find additional evidence that there may be a higher investment or expected return 
threshold for non-local deals.  If a venture capital firm has done or will do another investment in 
the same geographic area, there is a 2% drop in expected success.  VCs may lower their 
threshold on a potential deal if they have a lower marginal cost of visiting the area, i.e., if the 
venture capitalist is already visiting one portfolio company, the personal cost of visiting a second 
company is substantially lower. 
Venture capital firms are likely to locate in areas that offer them the highest concentration 
of profitable investments since geographically close investments are easier to for the venture 
capitalist to monitor.  Travel to other geographies is costly and will be undertaken only when an 
investment offers prospects for a high enough return to, in expectation, compensate the venture 
capitalist for the additional time and money associated with monitoring a distant investment.   
The resulting concentration of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs may pose grounds for 
concern given the positive public externalities associated with the establishment of new firms.  
For example, Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005) find that founders of venture capital-
backed startups disproportionately come from prior positions at previously venture capital-
backed companies.  If the supply of venture capital is a limiting factor for the establishment of 
new firms, policy makers in regions with low concentrations of venture capital may wish to 
provide incentives for established VCs based in venture capital centers to invest in their regions.   
This paper is related both to the existing literature on venture capital and on the 
importance of geography for economic growth.  Several papers document how venture capitalists 
monitor and advise their portfolio companies (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990), 7 
 
Lerner (1995) and Hellmann and Puri (2002)).  Bengtsson and Ravid (2009) find VC contracts 
are more high-powered as geographic distance increases, indicating that monitoring and soft 
information decrease with distance.  In economic geography, Zook (2002) argues that the 
regional distribution of venture capital investing played a role in determining the location of new 
Internet startups.  
More generally, there is an extensive literature documenting the continued importance of 
geographic clusters despite increasing globalization (see for example, Porter (1990), Krugman 
(1991) and Ellison and Glaeser (1997))  There is evidence for the importance of geographical 
clusters in investment management.   For example, Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) find 
evidence of knowledge spillovers and learning in the investment management industry, finding 
that mutual funds with experienced managers located in cities that are financial centers 
outperform.   Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) document similarities in trading patterns for 
investment managers in the same cities.   
It possible that the clusters we document arise from second-order agglomeration 
externalities, that is, VCs co-locate with the highly clustered industries in which they invest.  
Saxenian (1994) examines the importance of local industrial systems for entrepreneurial activity 
in Silicon Valley and along Route 128 near Boston. The importance of labor market pooling is 
found by Fallick, Fleischman, and Rebitzer (2006) who observe high rates of intra-industry labor 
mobility in the computer industry in Silicon Valley and Freedman (2008) who finds evidence for 
the importance of geographic clusters in a study of the software publishing industry.   Evidence 
of geographic knowledge spillovers is found in biotechnology by Zucker, Darby and Brewer 
(1998) and more recently by Agrawal, Kapur and McHale (2008), who document the importance 
of geographic proximity for inventors using patent data.  Industry clustering may be even more 8 
 
pronounced for spin-off firms than other concerns.   (See, for example, evidence of geographic 
patterns in spin-offs in Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005) for venture-backed companies, 
Klepper and Sleeper (2005) for the laser industry, and Sorenson and Audia (2000) for the 
footwear industry).  
In addition, there is a growing interest in understanding conditions that foster 
entrepreneurship.  Glaeser (2007) shows that more than half of the heterogeneity in the self-
employment rate can be explained by demographic and industrial variation.  Several papers 
document the importance of geographic factors such as local birth (Michelacci and Silva (2007)) 
and entrepreneurial levels of peers (Giannetti and Simonov (2008)).   In terms of new product 
and new industry development, Duranton and Puga (2001) theorize that new products are 
developed in big cities, and production later moves to specialized industry clusters.  
Understanding the factors that affect the geographic distribution of venture capital offices and 
investment activity provide insights into the forces that drive concentration of industries and new 
firm formation.     
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes the construction of the 
data.  Section III examines the geography of venture capital firms and geographic factors 
associated with the supply of venture capital.  Section IV describes the geography of venture 
capital-backed companies. Section V reviews the determinants of venture capital investment 
success.  Section VI proposes some implications of venture capital expansion for policymakers 
and Section VII concludes the paper. 
II. Data Sources 
We use the Pratt’s Guide to Private Equity and Venture Capital Sources to identify the 
location of venture capital firm offices.  The annually-updated Pratt’s Guide collects information 9 
 
about the capabilities, focus, and size of venture capital and buyout organizations throughout the 
world.  This information was collected by Venture Economics, formerly an independent research 
firm and later a unit of Thomson, through a survey annually distributed to private equity firms. 
We hand collect information from Pratt’s Guides released between 1974 and 2005 about the 
office locations of venture capital firms.  This information allows us to determine the location 
and year of founding and closing of each venture capital firm’s main office and branch offices. 
We only include offices in the United States because that is where the Pratt’s coverage is most 
comprehensive.  
We collect each venture capital office’s zip code from Pratt’s Guides and it to a 
Combined Statistical Area (CSA).  In cases such as San Diego, where a city is not located in a 
CSA, we assign venture capital offices in the city to the appropriate Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA).  Our use of CSA as the unit of location is driven by the narrow definition of certain 
MSAs.  For example, the cities of Palo Alto/Menlo Park, Berkeley, and San Francisco, CA are 
located in three different MSAs.  On the east coast, New York City is located in a different MSA 
from nearby cities such as Stamford and Greenwich, Connecticut, where New York area 
investors often choose to base their operations.  Therefore we use CSAs that appropriately assign 
Palo Alto and San Francisco to one location and similarly assign New York and Greenwich in 
one location.  
We gather information on venture capital financing activity from Thomson’s 
VentureXpert (formerly Venture Economics) database.  The database was started in 1977 and 
has since been back-filled through the 1960s.  It provides information about the dates of venture 
financings, the investors involved in each financing round, the amounts invested in each round, 
and the outcome of each venture capital-backed company in the database.  We use these data to 10 
 
create our main outcome measure of venture capital investment success: whether each venture-
backed company went public through an IPO or has registered for an IPO.  In addition to 
information on financing rounds and outcomes of venture capital investments, the database also 
provides information about the location of each portfolio company. As with the Pratt’s Guide 
office location data, we assign portfolio companies to a locale at the CSA level and, in cases 
where a portfolio company is located in an MSA that is not located in a CSA, at the MSA level.  
For the purposes of this study, we restrict our analysis period to investments made between 1975 
and 2005.  We drop investments prior to 1975 due to data quality concerns discussed by 
Gompers and Lerner (2004) and omit companies receiving initial investments after 2005 to 
account for the typical start-up to exit maturation period of venture capital-backed companies.     
  We merge the Pratt’s Guide and VentureXpert data and obtain investment information 
for 2,039 of the 3,290 venture capital firms cataloged by Pratt’s.  Conversely, we were able to 
match 80% of VentureXpert investments to firms tracked by Pratt’s.   75% of all venture capital 
firms identified by VentureXpert with at least 5 or more investments are matched to the Pratt’s 
Guide location data.  The remaining unmatched VentureXpert firms are mostly foreign venture 
capital firms, corporate VCs, and banking institutions. 
Using venture capital office location information from the Pratt’s Guide merged with 
investment and portfolio company information from the VentureXpert database, we are able to 
generate variables indicating the location of the venture capital firm relative to the location of the 
portfolio company it is investing in.  For each portfolio company a venture capital invests in, we 
use our merged data set to classify the deal as: 1) Main Office – portfolio company is located in 
the same CSA as the investing venture capital firm’s main office (defined as the first office 
opened by the investing venture capital firm.  If the firm was established with multiple offices, 11 
 
the CSA in which the firm made the most investments in its first five years of existence is 
classified as the main office); 2) Branch Office – portfolio company is located in the same CSA 
as one of the investing venture capital firm’s branch offices (defined as any location in which the 
firm has an office, other than the main office); 3) Outside – portfolio company is located in a 
CSA in which the investing venture capital firm does not have its main office or a branch office.  
This classification allows us to examine differences in outcomes based on the proximity of the 
venture capital firm to a portfolio company, as well as differences in performance by office type. 
  In addition to our venture capital data, we collect state-level information on 
characteristics related to employment and innovation.  Information about the level of educational 
attainment in a state is from annual editions of the Statistical Abstract of the United States.  Each 
state’s Gross Product is taken from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  To measure the business environment of each state, we obtain information on state 
marginal income tax rates and long-term capital gains tax rates from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research’s TAXSIM model.  Finally, we collect information about local innovation 
and patenting rates from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
 
III. Geography of Venture Capital Firms 
  Table I reports the location of venture capital firms by CSA across time.  The three 
centers of venture capital activity, San Francisco/San Jose, New York City, and Boston, are 
home to more than half of all venture capital offices in all years reported.  Over time, the three 
venture capital centers have maintained their numerical advantage despite an approximately 
three-fold increase in the number of venture capital firms and branch offices between 1985 and 
2000.  Also notable is the paucity of venture capital offices located in smaller CSAs.  Less than a 12 
 
third of all venture capital main offices and branch offices are located outside of the top nine 
CSAs.  In contrast, approximately 80% of the working-age population lived outside of the top 
nine CSAs in 2000.
4 
  In Table II, we compare the lifespan of main offices and branch offices.  We calculate a 
simple measure of longevity, the number of years between the office’s opening and closing.  In 
cases where the office remains open through the end of our sample in 2005, we calculate the 
number of years between the office opening and 2005.  Since the data is right censored, more 
recently opened offices will have lower life spans.  Therefore we construct a second measure, 
potential lifespan, in which we normalize the age of each office by dividing the age of the office 
by the number of potential years the office could have been open.  Potential years are defined as 
the number of years between office opening and 2005.  On average, a main office’s lifespan is 
2.2 years greater than the lifespan of a branch office.  This difference is statistically significant; 
the result is similar when using the potential lifespan measure.  The relatively longer longevity of 
main offices is true in the venture capital centers as well, although branch offices located in the 
venture capital centers have longer relative life spans than other branch offices. 
The finding that main offices are longer-lived than branch offices suggests that venture 
capital firms are more likely to close branch offices.  Venture capital offices in the venture 
capital centers (main or branch) are longer-lived than offices in other locales.  This longevity 
may reflect differences in deal flow (supply of venture capital investments) between these 
locations, or differences in preferences of investors (limited partners) to invest in funds with 
offices in these cities.  Other factors contributing to longevity may include issues we document 
                                                   
4 Calculated using 2000 micro-level Census data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) at 
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in later sections: the concentration of portfolio companies located in the venture capital centers 
and the outperformance of venture capital firms based in those areas. 
In Table III, we take a multivariate approach to analyzing the determinants of venture 
capital firm location. We estimate a series of six models in which the dependent variables 
measure the number of total, main, and branch venture capital offices in a CSA in a given year.  
All regression models are estimated at the CSA-Year level and we restrict the analysis to CSAs 
where at least one main or branch office existed between 1975 and 2005.  In some CSA-Years, 
the number of offices can equal zero.  For example, this can occur in the case where a venture 
firm opens an office in a remote area such as Sioux City, Iowa in 1995 and closes it in 2000.  
Prior to 1995 and after 2000, the number of offices reported in Sioux City would equal zero.   
A key explanatory variable of interest is the success rate of all VCs in the CSA over the 
past five years. This variable is constructed by calculating the percentage of all venture capital 
investments in the CSA over the past five years that led to an Initial Public Offering.  The results 
are similar when this success is defined as the investment either leading to an Initial Public 
Offering or a merger or acquisition.  We also include controls for local characteristics which may 
be associated with venture capital investments.  These controls include the log gross state 
product per capita, the state’s marginal income tax rate, and the state’s long-term capital gains 
tax rate in the year prior to the investment.  In order to capture an area’s potential for innovation, 
we control for the percentage of population with a college degree in that CSA, as well as the log 
number of patents per capita issued in the state in the previous year.  We include year fixed 
effects to control for changes in the supply of venture capital and investment opportunities.  
Finally, all standard errors are robust and calculated after clustering at the CSA level. 14 
 
The three principal findings of these regression models are as follows: 1) venture capital 
offices are concentrated in locales where venture capital investments have previously been 
successful; 2) regions with high concentrations of venture capital offices are in states with higher 
levels of gross state product per capita; and 3) venture capital offices are concentrated in areas 
with high levels of innovation as measured by the number of patents per capita issued in the 
previous year.  Focusing on the first column, where the dependent variable measures the log 
number of total venture capital offices, moving from the 25
th percentile of the regional success 
rate for venture capital investments over the past five years to the 75
th percentile of the regional 
success rate increases the number of offices in a CSA by 2.3.  Increasing log gross state product 
per capita from the 25
th percentile value to the 75
th percentile value increases the number of 
offices in a CSA by 4.1.  Finally, with respect to innovation, a CSA in a state at the 75
th 
percentile of innovation as measured by patents per capita will have 1.2 more offices than a CSA 
in a state at the 25
th percentile level of innovation.  Relative to an average of 11.5 venture capital 
offices in a CSA-year, these factors are economically and statistically associated with the number 
of venture capital offices in a CSA.  The results for the remaining regression models, which 
utilize dependent variables representing the log number of main offices and branch offices yield 
similar results.  These findings appear consistent with findings about the development of venture 
capital ecosystems (Saxenian (1994)).  Prior successes and innovation attract additional venture 
capital to a region and aid in the development of a self-sustaining environment for entrepreneurs.  
Similarly, as Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005) show, the feedstock for future venture 
capital-backed startups come from prior venture capital-backed companies.   15 
 
The results also highlight the “catch 22” issue in venture capital branch offices.  A high 
level of existing venture capital activity and success induce entry into a market. Yet a nascent 
startup market may find it difficult to attract venture capital investors. 
We next explore the determinants of each venture capital firm’s decision to expand by 
opening a branch office.  Branch offices are an interesting subset to consider, since they may be 
more responsive to local conditions.  Cities which are not venture capital centers may be 
interested in encouraging branch offices, since branch locations benefit from the expertise and 
connections of a strong head office.  The dependent variable in these probit models is one in the 
year that the venture capital firm opens an office in the CSA.  In years prior to the opening of the 
office the dependent variable is equal to zero.  If the venture capital firm never opens an office in 
the CSA, all of its Firm-CSA-Year observations will have the dependent variable equal to zero. 
In order to reduce the choice set to a more likely subset of firm expansion areas, we only include 
Firm-CSA-Year observations in regions in which the venture capital firm has at least one 
investment in that CSA prior to the year in question.   The firm will then have observations in the 
CSA beginning in the year that it makes its initial investment until the earlier of the year it opens 
an office in the CSA or 2005.   This methodology results in over-sampling of larger firms and 
firms with longer histories, since they may have invested in more regions or are in the sample for 
a longer period.  We include fixed effects at the VC firm level to control for any differences in 
firms’ predisposition for expansion.  Results are similar if we include all possible cities as 
choices for firm expansion. 
Table IV presents summary statistics for the characteristics of venture firms for each 
Firm-Year and Firm-CSA-Year analyzed.  Branch office expansion is quite rare.  In our sample, 
firms open branch offices in CSAs where they have previously invested in only 0.4% of Firm-16 
 
CSA-Years.  Venture capital firms exhibit a strong local bias.  We define local bias as the 
percentage of a venture capital firm’s investments that are made in a CSA over the past five 
years divided by the percentage of all venture capital investments that are made in the CSA over 
the past five years.  Average local bias is 5.79, implying that the share of investments in a 
venture capital firm’s portfolio made in a given CSA over the past five years is nearly six times 
greater than one would expect based on aggregate venture capital investment patterns. The 
average five-year success rate of a venture capital firm in a CSA is 18.6%. On average, firms 
have made 49 previous venture capital investments.  Because there is a time trend and the 
number of investments a venture capital firm makes will increase over the course of the firm’s 
lifespan, we follow our previous work (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2008)) and 
calculate a measure of adjusted venture capital firm experience.  This measure is equal to the log 
of one plus the number of previous investments made by the venture capital firm minus the log 
of one plus the number of prior investments the average venture capital investor has made as of 
the year in question.  The average adjusted experience of VCs in our sample is -0.44 (with one 
observation per each year the firm was in existence), reflecting the relative inexperience and 
short lifespan of the average firm.   
We test to see if a firm’s organizational structure affects the decision to expand to a new 
geographic location.  Our first measure of organizational structure is industry diversification.  
We calculate a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, using the nine major industries identified by 
Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2008).  The Herfindahl is equal to the sum of the 
squares of the percentage of the firm’s investments over the previous five years in each of the 
nine industry classifications. A firm with a Herfindahl value of 1 has invested in only one of the 
industries over the past five years.  The average Firm-Year Herfindahl is .44, implying that over 17 
 
the past five years the average firm made at least 46% of all its investments in a single industry.   
Our second measure of organizational structure is size, as measured by the number of partners at 
the firm.  The average venture capital firm is small and employs 5.4 individuals; 3.4 of whom are 
General Partners.   
Table V reports the results of estimating probit models of the determinants of opening a 
venture capital branch office at the Firm-CSA-Year level. We examine the factors associated 
with opening a branch office for 7,328 Firm-Years and 42,302 Firm-CSA-Years.  Each 
specification includes venture capital firm-year fixed effects.  Because CSAs appear in the 
regressions multiple times in each year, we calculate robust standard errors clustered by CSA.  
The success rate for all VC investments in a CSA over the past five years is important to the 
firm’s decision to open a branch office.  Using the coefficients from specification 2, we find that 
a 10% increase in the overall success rate of venture capital investments in a CSA increases the 
likelihood of a new branch office in that region by approximately 35%.  This implies that venture 
capital firms are chasing the success they observe others experiencing in CSAs.  Interestingly, 
while overall industry success in the area is important, we do not find evidence that a venture 
capital firm’s own success in a CSA over the past five years is associated with opening an office: 
the firm’s own success rate in a CSA does not play a significant role in the decision to open a 
branch office in the CSA.  The results seem to indicate that the overall environment is what 
attracts new offices, not the personal experience of a firm. 
Surprisingly, we find that experienced venture capital firms are less likely to open branch 
offices.  Moving from a firm at the 25
th percentile of adjusted VC firm experience to a firm at the 
75
th percentile of adjusted VC firm experience actually decreases the likelihood of opening a 
branch office in a year by 35%.  This is initially puzzling, since the most experienced and 18 
 
successful firms likely have the easiest access to additional capital for expansion.  Perhaps the 
most successful firms are already seeing the most interesting investment opportunities, regardless 
of the geographic region of the company.  Even after controlling for experience, firms based in 
the San Francisco/San Jose CSA are 50% less likely to open branch offices than are venture 
capital firms based in other locales.  Well-known San Francisco/San Jose firms with a single 
U.S. office include Kleiner, Perkins, Sequoia Capital, Accel Partners, and U.S. Venture 
Partners.
5  Given the high concentration of portfolio companies in the San Francisco/San Jose 
CSA we document in the following section, this result is not unexpected. 
 
IV. Geography of Venture Capital-Backed Portfolio Companies 
  Much like venture capital firms, venture capital-backed portfolio companies are heavily 
concentrated in three cities.  Table VI presents a distribution of the geography of portfolio 
companies from our combined Pratt’s Guide/VentureXpert data set.  As with venture capital 
offices, approximately half of all venture capital-backed portfolio companies are located in San 
Francisco/San Jose, New York, or Boston. 49% of all investments in venture capital-backed 
companies (54% of VC-company observations) are made in companies located in these three 
cities.  Moving beyond the three central cities, 79% of all portfolio companies are located in the 
top 12 CSAs and 81% of all venture capital investments are made in companies in the top 12 
CSAs.   
We examine the location of portfolio companies in relation to the offices of their venture 
capital investors. Of the 12,358 investments in the sample that involve a venture capital investor 
located in the same CSA, 80% of these are in one of the three venture capital centers.  More than 
60% of San Francisco/San Jose companies have their venture capital investor located in their 
                                                   
5 Many leading firms, however, have opened overseas offices or established affiliate relationships in recent years. 19 
 
region, while less than 15% of companies headquartered in Philadelphia can say the same.  
Overall, most investments (57%) are made by venture capital firms outside of their home CSA.  
Despite the importance of monitoring in venture capital, many venture capitalists do invest 
outside of their home region.  San Francisco/San Jose and New York are the only two CSAs in 
which a majority of the venture capital-backed companies were investments made by local 
venture capitalists (main or branch).   
In Table VII, we explore the determinants of the number of new venture capital financed 
companies in each CSA year.  We include “new” companies only once, in the year in which we 
observe the first investment by any venture capital firm in VentureXpert.  We exclude CSAs in 
which no venture capital investment has ever been observed.   Similar to Table III, these models 
are estimated at the CSA-Year level, include year fixed effects, and report robust standard errors 
are calculated after clustering for CSA.  On average, 4.2 portfolio companies are formed in a 
given CSA-Year.  In the third regression column, we estimate that the number of venture capital 
firms in a CSA is positively associated with the number of venture capital-backed companies.  
Moving from the 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile of venture capital offices in a CSA 
increases the number of venture capital-backed companies formed annually by 1.8 companies.  
This result indicates that increasing the number of venture capital firms in a CSA, and hence the 
availability of capital in a CSA, should be associated with an increase in the number of 
innovative startup companies in the CSA that are venture-capital backed.  Interestingly, we also 
predict that five additional venture capital-backed portfolio companies will be formed in San 
Francisco/San Jose versus another CSA that shares the other observed features.  All else equal, 
venture capital firms still invest in a greater number of San Francisco/San Jose portfolio 
companies than in other CSAs.  Finally, we observe that more venture capital-backed companies 20 
 
are formed in CSAs with greater levels of past success. Moving from a CSA at the 25
th percentile 
of the previous success rate to a CSA at the 75
th percentile previous success rate increases the 
number of venture capital-backed companies formed by 0.4 companies.  These results support 
the findings of Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005), who find that regions with previously 
successful venture capital-backed companies that went public are more likely to spawn 
additional venture capital-backed companies. 
 
V. Determinants of Venture Capital Investment Success 
It is natural to wonder whether there are any performance consequences of the 
geographic concentration we observe.  In essence, if there is a venture funding gap in other 
cities, i.e., if supply of good ideas exceeds the availability of capital, remote venture capital 
locations may have greater success rates than firms in the three leading venture capital markets. 
We next compare the performance of firms based in and outside of the venture capital centers.  
Table VIII compares the mean success rates of venture capital center-based firms and firms 
based outside of those centers.  Overall, firms based in the venture capital centers have an 
average success rate that is 4.4% higher than venture-backed firms based outside those centers.  
Central VC firms outperform other VC firms, whether we examine main office, branch office, or 
outside investments.  These differences are all statistically significant at the 1% level.  VC firms 
from the venture capital center cities appear to outperform, when restricting our sample to 
investments made inside the venture capital center cities (17.3% vs. 14.2%) or to those outside of 
the venture capital center cities (19.0% vs. 13.1%).  This outperformance also persists when we 
restrict the sample to early-stage (15.1% vs. 11.3%) or late-stage deals (20.7% vs. 15.7%).  
These bi-variate analyses provide strong suggestive evidence that VC firms from the venture 21 
 
capital center cities outperform VC firms based outside of the central cities.  To confirm these 
results, we analyze the determinants of success using a multivariate approach. 
Table IX reports summary statistics for variables used in the multivariate analyses of the 
determinants of venture capital investment success.  66.4% of the investments in the sample are 
made by VC firms based in one of the three venture capital center cities.  The overall investment 
success rate is 16.4%.  Interestingly, investments in the main office region appear to 
underperform relative to other geographies.  Average success rates for investments in the main 
office regions are 14.5%, while the branch office and outside office investment success rates are 
both approximately 17%, a difference that is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Of course, 
our success measure is relatively blunt, and does not distinguish between home runs and singles 
(investments that return ten times vs. two times invested capital).   Of course venture capital firm 
quality may vary and be associated with geography and outcomes.  We proxy for quality with 
experience: the average adjusted VC firm experience in the sample is 0.48, indicating that the 
average VC making an investment is more experienced than the average VC firm in that year.  
This is not unexpected because more successful VC firms tend to make more investments.   
Another important variable is the stage of the company at the time of investment.  In terms of 
company stage at financing, more than half (51%) of venture capital investments in the sample 
are made in the initial round of investment.  A greater proportion of main office investments 
(56.6%) are made in the initial round versus 44.5% of branch office investments and 47.9% of 
outside investments.  Finally, industries may have different geographic patterns and success 
rates.  Venture capital investments in the sample are heavily concentrated in three industries: 
computers and internet (45.3%), biotech and healthcare (21.3%), and communications (17.6%). 22 
 
Table X uses a multivariate approach to analyze the factors associated with successful 
venture capital investments.  All regression models control for the quality of the venture capital 
firm (using adjusted experience), year of investment, the round of investment, the industry of the 
portfolio company, and the location of the portfolio company.  The first column reports a key 
finding of the paper.  The coefficient on the dummy variable indicating that the VC firm is based 
in one of the three venture capital centers (CENTRAL), which is statistically significant, indicates 
that venture capital firms based in the venture capital centers have a 3.1% higher probability of 
succeeding.  Controlling for location, branch office investments and outside investments have an 
approximately 2.0% higher probability of success than main office investments.  
To identify the source of excess performance of venture capital firms based in the venture 
capital centers, we add interactions between CENTRAL and the branch office investment and 
outside investment dummy variables in the third column of Table X.  After adding these 
interaction variables, the coefficient on CENTRAL falls from 0.031 to 0.010 and is no longer 
statistically different from zero.  As expected, venture capital firm experience continues to have a 
positive and statistically significant association with investment success.  At the means of the 
other variables, venture capital firms at the 25
th percentile of adjusted VC firm experience have a 
predicted success rate of 12.0%, versus a predicted success rate of 13.4% for firms at the 75
th 
percentile of adjusted VC firm experience.  However, the interaction of CENTRAL and adjusted 
VC firm experience is not statistically different than zero.  This indicates that firm experience is 
not mediated through the firm being located in a venture capital center.   
The coefficient on the interaction of CENTRAL and outside investment is 0.029 and 
statistically significant at the one percent level.  Investments made by venture capital firms from 
the venture capital centers in portfolio companies located in CSAs not local to the venture capital 23 
 
firm’s offices have a 2.9% higher probability of succeeding.  The coefficient on the interaction of 
CENTRAL and branch investment is 0.021, not statistically different than zero.  The drop in 
value of the coefficient on CENTRAL and the statistical significance of the interaction between 
CENTRAL and outside investment provide evidence that the outperformance of venture capital 
firms based in the venture capital centers can be attributed to their outsized performance in 
investments made outside of the venture capital firms’ office locations. 
In the fourth column, we present evidence that venture capital firms may lower the 
threshold for investment quality in areas where they invest multiple times.  The coefficient on the 
dummy variable indicating that the venture capital firm has made one or more investments in the 
CSA in the two years before or after the date of investment is -0.021.  When a VC firm has 
recently invested or will invest in the near future, its investments have a 2.1% lower probability 
of success.  Perhaps venture capital firms lower the bar on a new investment if they have a lower 
marginal cost of visiting the company.  A general partner may be willing to make an investment 
in a company with less promising prospects than the average company she invests in if another 
investment already takes her to the CSA on a regular basis.   
Finally, we test to see if a local co-investor matters.  If non-local investors can delegate 
monitoring to a local investor, this should mitigate the estimated effect of distance.  The fifth 
specification of Table X includes a dummy variable indicating if there are one or more local 
investors in the syndicate.  The coefficient on this dummy variable is not statistically different 
from zero, and the coefficient on the interaction of CENTRAL and outside investment remains of 
the same magnitude.   This result suggests that local co-investors may not be adequate 
monitoring substitutes for venture capital center-based VC investors.   It is also evidence that 24 
 
increasing the number of local VCs may not necessarily impact the decision of VCs in venture 
capital centers to invest in a region. 
Another concern with the analysis was that we looked only at whether the investments 
were successful, not how successful they were. For a subset of 5,109 investments for which we 
were able to find valuation information from SDC or Factset, we looked at the scale of 
investment success.   We calculate exit multiples on venture capital investments as the exit value 
of the portfolio company divided by paid-in capital.  While branch office investments and 
outside investments are more likely to IPO, exit multiples are similar across main office 
investments, branch office investments, and outside investments. 
In unreported specifications, we tested to see if the number of airplane departures from 
the location of a portfolio company to venture capital centers is associated with success, but did 
not find any relationship.  We also tested to see if the number of airplane departures between the 
location of the venture capital firm investor and the location of the portfolio company but found 
no relationship.  This may be because airplane departures are not a good proxy for personal costs 
of venture capitalist travel.  
To the extent that location is important because venture capital firms are actively 
monitoring the businesses they invest in, we would expect location to be particularly important 
for early-stage businesses.  Table XI restricts our regression models to include only early-stage 
investments, with of course a reduced sample size.  The control variables in Table XI are 
identical to the controls in Table X, with the exception that we omit investment round controls 
from the specifications in Table XI. In the first column, we again find that venture capital firms 
from the three leading venture cities outperform venture capital firms based in other locales.  The 
coefficient on CENTRAL, which is statistically significant, is 0.014, indicating that venture 25 
 
capital firms based in the central cities have a 1.4% higher probability of succeeding than venture 
capital firms based outside of the three central cities.  This difference in probability of success 
between these and other firms is lower than the difference for the entire sample, but still 
represents a significant level of outperformance. Furthermore, we find that branch office 
investments have a 2.5% higher probability of success versus main office investments and 
outside investments have a 1.5% higher probability of success versus main office investments.    
Similar to the specifications in Table X, we add interactions between CENTRAL and 
branch investment and CENTRAL and outside investment in the third column of Table XI and 
obtain similar results to those shown in Table X.  In column four, we find that the coefficient on 
the dummy variable indicating that the venture capital firm has made one or more investments in 
the CSA in the two years before or after the date of investment is also similar.  In column five, 
we continue to estimate no impact of a local co-investor.  Thus, even in early-stage investments, 
we find evidence of lower success rates in regions where VCs are located and in regions where 
VCs make multiple investments.     
  The results presented in Tables X and XI are robust to a number of alternative 
specifications, including broadening the definition of success to include the investment being 
merged or acquired in addition to an initial public offering, excluding investments made during 
the years of the technology bubble (1998-2000) and including CSA fixed effects.  The findings 
are also similar if estimated only using the first fifteen investments of a venture capital 
organization, suggesting that the results are not merely artifacts of past success. They are also 
robust to excluding investments made during 1999 and 2000, the years most closely associated 
with the technology bubble.  
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VI. Implications 
The concentration of venture capital firms that we document may be a rational allocation 
of scarce resources.  Many venture capital investments are in industries where geographically 
localized knowledge spillovers are likely to be important.  Accordingly, venture capital firms 
locate to maximize benefits from these spillovers.  A virtuous cycle of co-location is maintained 
as entrepreneurs choose to locate their businesses closer to funding sources, pools of talented 
employees, and academic researchers. The higher success rate for companies based in the 
venture capital centers suggests that these may be optimal geographies for founding new 
venture-backed businesses. 
However, this allocation of resources may not be desirable from the perspective of local 
governments and other cities that seek local employment growth and consequent spillovers. Our 
results on the determinants of branch office openings suggest that anything that policy makers do 
that contributes to an increase in the number of successful venture-backed investments in a 
region will also increase the probability of a venture branch office opening in that region.  If 
local governments want to encourage venture capital investing, our results suggest that they 
should consider supporting the efforts of funds such as Village Ventures, which is based in 
Williamstown, Massachusetts and focuses on new ventures outside of the leading venture areas, 
or Draper Fisher Jurvetson, which has a network of smaller affiliated firms located in diverse 
geographies such as Houston, Texas and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
Our results that non-local investments made by firms based in the venture capital center 
cities outperform suggest that venture capital groups based in these cities may be focusing on 
“home runs” when doing non-local deals.  This may be because they have less access to 
proprietary deal flow and there may be higher personal costs associated with monitoring these 27 
 
companies.   Since experienced venture capital firms achieve consistently higher success rates in 
these investments, if policy makers outside of the central cities wish to encourage development, 
they may wish to provide incentives for more experienced firms to invest outside of their home 
areas.  Finally, since we find evidence that a venture capital firm’s existing investments in a 
region affect expected success on other deals in that region, bringing first-time venture capital 
investors to a region may be more effective than subsidizing existing investors.   
 
VII. Conclusion 
We document the geographic concentration of venture capital firms in three \areas, San 
Francisco, New York, and Boston.  We find the success rate of venture capital investments in a 
region is an important determinant of venture capital firms’ decisions to open new branches.  
While venture capital firms located in these three cities outperform, that outperformance is not 
driven by local investments.  Interestingly, some of the performance disparity between local and 
non-local investments disappears when the venture firm does more than one investment in a 
region, suggesting that as the marginal monitoring cost falls, venture capital firms may reduce 
their expected success rate for investment in a distant geography.  Our findings are informative 
both to researchers in economic geography, and to policy makers who seek to attract venture 
capital.     28 
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Table I. Geography of Venture Capital Firm Offices 
 
CSA 
Year     Share of Offices 
1985  1990  1995  2000  2005     1985  1990  1995  2000  2005 
San Jose-San Francisco, CA - Main Offices  65  78  97  234  230    15.0%  15.1%  15.9%  17.6%  21.6% 
San Jose-San Francisco, CA - Branch Offices  17  32  36  44  33    4.0%  5.9%  6.7%  6.3%  2.8% 
New York, NY - Main Offices  91  96  96  205  196    21.4%  16.9%  15.7%  16.1%  18.4% 
New York, NY - Branch Offices  4  9  13  15  14    0.4%  1.1%  1.7%  1.3%  1.2% 
Boston, MA - Main Offices  44  54  52  93  83    10.1%  10.1%  9.3%  8.6%  7.4% 
Boston, MA - Branch Offices  5  11  13  15  10    0.9%  1.6%  2.1%  2.0%  1.1% 
Washington, DC - Main Offices  12  16  17  54  51    3.1%  3.0%  2.4%  2.9%  4.8% 
Washington, DC - Branch Offices  0  5  5  13  7    0.0%  0.7%  0.7%  1.3%  0.5% 
Chicago, IL - Main Offices  13  23  26  41  35    2.9%  3.9%  4.5%  4.6%  3.3% 
Chicago, IL - Branch Offices  1  4  6  7  2    0.2%  0.7%  1.2%  0.9%  0.2% 
Dallas, TX - Main Offices  11  8  12  27  34    4.8%  4.6%  2.8%  3.0%  3.1% 
Dallas, TX - Branch Offices  6  7  5  5  5    0.2%  1.2%  1.2%  1.2%  0.3% 
Los Angeles, CA - Main Offices  21  23  13  37  34    2.4%  1.2%  1.7%  1.3%  2.8% 
Los Angeles, CA - Branch Offices  1  7  6  8  3    1.1%  1.1%  0.7%  0.3%  0.4% 
Seattle, WA - Main Offices  6  8  9  29  28    1.3%  1.4%  1.2%  1.3%  2.3% 
Seattle, WA - Branch Offices  1  4  5  1  1    0.2%  0.7%  0.7%  0.0%  0.1% 
Atlanta, GA - Main Offices  7  12  10  23  23    1.8%  1.8%  1.6%  1.4%  2.0% 
Atlanta, GA - Branch Offices  1  3  4  5  0    0.0%  0.5%  0.5%  0.3%  0.3% 
Other - Main Offices  115  138  141  298  273    27.1%  25.2%  23.0%  22.9%  23.8% 
Other - Branch Offices  16  20  34  52  47     3.1%  3.2%  6.2%  6.8%  3.6% 
Total Main Offices  385  456  473  1041  987    88.1%  81.7%  78.8%  86.3%  89.0% 
Total Branch Offices  52  102  127  165  122     11.9%  18.3%  21.2%  13.7%  11.0% 
 
Sample consists of 2,039 unique venture capital firms in existence between 1975 and 2005.  Geographic locations are assigned at the Combined Statistical Area (CSA) level.  In 
cases where a city is not located in a CSA, we assign venture capital offices in the city to the appropriate Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  Main Offices are defined as the first 
office opened by the investing venture capital firm.  If the firm was established with multiple offices, the CSA in which the firm made the most investments in its first five years of 
existence is classified as the main office.  Branch Offices are defined as any location in which the firm has an office, other than the main office.  Share of offices is defined as the 
percentage of total venture capital offices located in the CSA. 
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Table II. Venture Capital Firm Office Lifespans 
CSA 
Average Lifespan 
(Years)    
Average Lifespan 
(% of Potential Years)    
Number 
Main  Branch 
Statistical 
Difference    Main  Branch 
Statistical 
Difference    Main  Branch 
San Francisco/San Jose, CA  7.95  7.08      0.805  0.598  ***    400  93 
New York, NY  7.73  6.44      0.684  0.622      417  32 
Boston, MA  8.05  5.10  **    0.681  0.506  **    180  42 
All  venture capital centers  7.88  6.46  ***    0.732  0.580  ***    997  167 
All other cities  6.87  4.35  ***    0.671  0.408  ***    1,042  267 
Total  7.36  5.16  ***     0.701  0.473  ***     2,039  434 
 
Sample consists of 2,039 unique venture capital firms in existence between 1975 and 2005.  Lifespan is defined as the number of years between the office 
opening and closing.  In cases where the office remains open through the end of our sample in 2005, we calculate the number of years between the office opening 
and 2005.  Potential lifespan is equal to lifespan divided by the number of potential years the office could have been open.  Potential years are defined as the 
number of years between office opening and 2005.  Geographic locations are assigned at the Combined Statistical Area (CSA) level.  In cases where a city is not 
located in a CSA, we assign venture capital offices in the city to the appropriate Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  Main Offices are defined as the first office 
opened by the investing venture capital firm.  If the firm was established with multiple offices, the CSA in which the firm made the most investments in its first 
five years of existence is classified as the main office.  Branch Offices are defined as any location in which the firm has an office, other than the main office.  
Venture capital centers are defined as San Francisco/San Jose, New York, and Boston.   
 
There also exist statistically significant differences at the 1% level in lifespan and potential lifespan between main offices located inside and outside the elite 
cities and between branch offices located inside and outside the venture capital centers. 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 33 
 
Table III. Factors Associated with the Geographic Concentration of Venture Capital Firm Offices 
   Log Number of Offices in 
year 
Log Number of Main 
Offices in year 
Log Number of Branch 
Offices in year 
  OLS  OLS  OLS 
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Success rate of all VCs in CSA, 
past five years 
3.117  3.108  1.626  1.618  0.539  0.530 
[5.86]***  [5.86]***  [5.17]***  [5.16]***  [3.89]***  [3.88]*** 
Log GDP per Capita  1.461  1.455  0.727  0.724  0.204  0.200 
[3.30]***  [3.22]***  [2.57]**  [2.48]**  [1.74]*  [1.66]* 
Percent of population with college 
degree or higher 
0.017  0.018  0.021  0.022  0.014  0.015 
[0.62]  [0.66]  [1.49]  [1.55]  [2.06]**  [2.22]** 
Log patents per capita  0.347  0.349  0.169  0.172  0.055  0.058 
[2.64]***  [2.63]***  [2.25]**  [2.25]**  [1.74]*  [1.76]* 
State long-term capital gains tax 
rate 
0.331    0.599    0.618   
[0.11]    [0.34]    [0.65]   
State income tax rate    -0.275    0.058    0.002 
  [0.10]    [0.04]    [0.00] 
Includes year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2,256  2,256  2,256  2,256  2,256  2,256 
R-squared  0.26  0.26  0.28  0.28  0.13  0.12 
 
Sample consists of 2,256 CSA-Year observations for 197 CSAs where at least one venture capital office existed between 1975 and 2005.  The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of the number of venture capital offices plus one in the CSA-Year in columns 1 and 2, the natural logarithm of the number of main 
offices plus one in the CSA-Year in columns 3 and 4, and the natural logarithm of the number of branch offices plus one in the CSA-Year in columns 5 and 6.   
Geographic locations are assigned at the Combined Statistical Area (CSA) level.  In cases where a city is not located in a CSA, we assign venture capital offices 
in the city to the appropriate Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  Main Offices are defined as the first office opened by the investing venture capital firm.  If 
the firm was established with multiple offices, the CSA in which the firm made the most investments in its first five years of existence is classified as the main 
office.  Branch Offices are defined as any location in which the firm has an office, other than the main office.  Success rate of all VCs in CSA, past five years 
measures the percentage of all venture capital investments in the CSA over the past five years that led to an Initial Public Offering.   Log GSP per Capita is the 
natural logarithm of the state’s gross product per capita plus one in the previous year.  Percent of population with college degree or higher is the share of the 
state population that has graduated from college.  Log patents per capita is the number of patents per capita plus one issued in the state in the previous year.  
State long-term capital gains tax rate and state income tax rate are average state marginal tax rates in the previous year. 
  
Standard errors are clustered at the CSA-level.  Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 34 
 
Table IV.  Summary Statistics for Factors Associated with the Venture Capital Firm Branch Office Opening Decision 
Measure  Observations  Mean  S.D.  P25  Median  P75  P90  Unit of observation 
Firm-Year-CSA controls 
Opened a branch office in CSA  42,032  0.0042  0.0648  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  Firm-Year-CSA 
Local bias  42,032  5.7907  18.5012  0.9783  1.9320  4.4846  11.0720  Firm-Year-CSA 
Percentage of firm's deals in CSA, past five years  42,032  0.0894  0.1076  0.0303  0.0556  0.1034  0.2000  Firm-Year-CSA 
Percentage of all deals in CSA, past five years  42,032  0.0526  0.0718  0.0128  0.0259  0.0538  0.1175  Firm-Year-CSA 
VC's success rate in CSA, past five years  42,032  0.1857  0.0760  0.0000  0.0000  0.2500  1.0000  Firm-Year-CSA 
Success rate of all VCs in CSA, past five years  42,032  0.1452  0.0760  0.0825  0.1307  0.2000  0.2500  Firm-Year-CSA 
Firm-Year controls 
VC firm experience  7,328  48.7690  68.6850  13.0000  25.0000  59.0000  113.0000  Firm-Year 
Adjusted VC firm experience  7,328  -0.4379  1.0611  -1.1540  -0.4892  0.3241  0.9383  Firm-Year 
Firm's industry diversification, past five years  7,328  0.4376  0.2172  0.2800  0.3750  0.5372  0.7715  Firm-Year 
Size of firm, prior year  7,328  5.4349  4.9258  3.0000  4.0000  7.0000  10.0000  Firm-Year 
Size of firm, number of partners, prior year  7,328  3.4425  3.6964  1.0000  3.0000  4.0000  7.0000  Firm-Year 
Firm based in San Francisco/Silicon Valley  7,328  0.2403  0.4273  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  Firm-Year 
Firm based in Boston  7,328  0.1288  0.3350  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  Firm-Year 
Firm based in New York City  7,328  0.0797  0.2708  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  Firm-Year 
 
Sample consists of 42,032 Firm-Year-CSA observations for 7,328 Firm-Years between 1975 and 2005.  Only Firm-CSA-Year observations in regions in which a venture capital 
firm has at least one investment in that CSA prior to the year in question are included in the sample.  Geographic locations are assigned at the Combined Statistical Area (CSA) 
level.  In cases where a city is not located in a CSA, we assign venture capital offices in the city to the appropriate Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  Opened an office in CSA 
is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the venture capital firm opened a branch office in the CSA-Year and zero otherwise.  Local bias is the percentage of a 
venture capital firm’s investments that were made in a CSA over the past five years divided by the percentage of all venture capital investments that were made in the CSA over 
the past five years.  Percentage of firm’s deals in CSA, past five years measures the percentage of the venture capital firm’s investments that were made in the CSA over the past 
five years.  Percentage of all deals in CSA, past five years measures the percentage of all venture capital investments that were made in the CSA over the past five years.  VC’s 
success rate in CSA, past five years measures the percentage of venture capital firm’s investments in the CSA over the past five years that led to an Initial Public Offering.  Success 
rate of all VCs in CSA, past five years measures the percentage of all venture capital investments in the CSA over the past five years that led to an Initial Public Offering.  VC firm 
experience measures the number of prior investments the venture capital firm has made.  Adjusted VC firm experience is equal to the log of one plus the number of previous 
investments made by the venture capital firm minus the log of one plus the number of prior investments the average venture capital investor has made as of the year in question. 
Firm’s industry diversification is a Herfindahl-Hirschman index equal to the sum of the squares of the percentage of the firm’s investments over the previous five years in each of 
nine industry classifications identified by Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2008).  Size of firm, prior year is defined as the number of individuals working at the venture 
capital firm in the previous year.  Size of firm, number of partners, prior year reports the number of partners at the venture capital firm in the previous year.  Firm based in San 
Francisco/Silicon Valley, Boston, and New York City variables are indicator variables that take on the value of one if the venture capital firm is based in the named city and zero 
otherwise.    35 
 
Table V.  Factors Associated with the Venture Capital Firm Branch Office Opening Decision 
  Opened an office in CSA 
  Probit 
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Firm's industry diversification, past five years  -0.0008  -0.0002  -0.0023  -0.0016 
[0.50]  [0.14]  [1.43]  [0.24] 
Size of firm, prior year  -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0000 
[1.29]  [1.15]  [0.33]  [0.14] 
Local bias  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
[4.16]***  [4.00]***  [3.82]***  [3.77]*** 
VC's success rate in CSA, past five years  0.0001  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002 
[0.10]  [0.18]  [0.20]  [0.14] 
Success rate of all VCs in CSA, past five years  0.0152  0.0148  0.0150  0.0146 
[3.93]***  [3.96]***  [4.01]***  [3.97]*** 
Firm based in San Francisco/Silicon Valley    -0.0025    -0.0021 
  [4.05]***    [3.27]*** 
Firm based in Boston    0.0002    0.0004 
  [0.22]    [0.46] 
Firm based in New York City    -0.0004    -0.0001 
  [0.53]    [1.02] 
Adjusted VC firm experience      -0.0012  -0.0010 
    [3.73]***  [3.11]*** 
Firm-Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  42,032  42,032  42,032  42,032 
 
Sample consists of 42,032 Firm-Year-CSA observations for 7,328 Firm-Years between 1975 and 2005.  The 
dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the venture capital firm opened a branch 
office in the CSA-Year and zero otherwise.  Only Firm-CSA-Year observations in regions in which a venture capital 
firm has at least one investment in that CSA prior to the year in question are included in the sample.  Geographic 
locations are assigned at the Combined Statistical Area (CSA) level.  In cases where a city is not located in a CSA, 
we assign venture capital offices in the city to the appropriate Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  Firm’s industry 
diversification is a Herfindahl-Hirschman index equal to the sum of the squares of the percentage of the firm’s 
investments over the previous five years in each of nine industry classifications identified by Gompers, Kovner, 
Lerner and Scharfstein (2008).  Size of firm, prior year is defined as the number of individuals working at the 
venture capital firm in the previous year.  Local bias is the percentage of a venture capital firm’s investments that 
are made in a CSA over the past five years divided by the percentage of all venture capital investments that are made 
in the CSA over the past five years.  VC’s success rate in CSA, past five years measures the percentage of venture 
capital firm’s investments in the CSA over the past five years that led to an Initial Public Offering.  Success rate of 
all VCs in CSA, past five years measures the percentage of all venture capital investments in the CSA over the past 
five years that led to an Initial Public Offering.  Firm based in San Francisco/Silicon Valley, Boston, and New York 
City variables are indicator variables that take on the value of one if the venture capital firm is based in the named 
city and zero otherwise.  Adjusted VC firm experience is equal to the log of one plus the number of previous 
investments made by the venture capital firm minus the log of one plus the number of prior investments the average 
venture capital investor has made as of the year in question.  
 
Standard errors are clustered at the CSA-level.  Robust z-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table VI. Geography of Venture Capital-Backed Portfolio Companies 
  
Portfolio Company 
Location    
Main Office 
Investment Location    
Branch Office 
Investment Location    
Outside Investment 
Location    
Share of Investments in CSA 
CSA  Number 
% Share 
of Total     Number 
% Share 
of Total     Number 
% Share 
of Total     Number 
% Share 




Office  Outside 
San Jose-San Francisco, CA  4,063  29.01    5,462  53.91    1,584  71.13    2,612  16.25    56.55  16.40  27.04 
Boston, MA  1,634  11.67    1,511  14.91    288  12.93    1,770  11.01    42.34  8.07  49.59 
New York, NY  1,224  8.74    1,012  9.99    50  2.25    1,049  6.53    47.94  2.37  49.69 
Los Angeles, CA  851  6.08    184  1.82    39  1.75    1,319  8.20    11.93  2.53  85.54 
Washington, DC  584  4.17    214  2.11    65  2.92    742  4.62    20.96  6.37  72.67 
San Diego, CA  494  3.53    77  0.76    43  1.93    1,028  6.39    6.71  3.75  89.55 
Dallas, TX  411  2.93    129  1.27    70  3.14    558  3.47    17.04  9.25  73.71 
Seattle, WA  383  2.73    138  1.36    2  0.09    653  4.06    17.40  0.25  82.35 
Denver, CO  369  2.63    166  1.64    4  0.18    562  3.50    22.68  0.55  76.78 
Atlanta, GA  348  2.48    123  1.21    2  0.09    475  2.95    20.50  0.33  79.17 
Chicago, IL  303  2.16    144  1.42    4  0.18    321  2.00    30.70  0.85  68.44 
Philadelphia, PA  302  2.16    71  0.70    11  0.49    468  2.91    12.91  2.00  85.09 
Other  3,040  21.70    900  8.88    65  3.01    4,519  28.11    16.41  1.19  82.40 
Total  14,006  100.00     10,131  100.00     2,227  100.00     16,076  100.00     35.63  7.83  56.54 
 
Sample consists of 28,434 venture capital investments in 14,006 portfolio companies for 2,039 venture capital firms between 1975 and 2005.  Geographic locations are assigned at 
the Combined Statistical Area (CSA) level.  In cases where a city is not located in a CSA, we assign portfolio companies in the city to the appropriate Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA).  Main office investment is defined as a portfolio company investment in a CSA in which the investing venture capital firm has its main office.  Branch office investment is 
defined as a portfolio company investment in a CSA in which the investing venture capital firm has a branch office.  Outside investment is defined as a portfolio company 
investment in a CSA in which the investing venture capital firm does not have its main office or a branch office.  % Share of Total equals the percentage of portfolio companies or 
investment type located in the CSA.  Share of investments in CSA is defined as the percentage of portfolio company investments in the CSA that are main office investments, 
branch office investments, or outside investments. 37 
 
Table VII. Factors Associated with the Geographic Concentration of Venture  
Capital-Backed Portfolio Companies 
  
Log Number of Portfolio Companies receiving 
initial investment in year       
  OLS       
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Log Number of VC firms in 
CSA 
0.740  0.740  0.696  0.696 
[14.43]***  [14.25]***  [18.90]***  [18.98]*** 
Success rate of all VCs in CSA, 
past five years 
1.110  1.101  1.148  1.144 
[6.85]***  [6.78]***  [7.21]***  [7.24]*** 
Log GSP per Capita  -0.306  -0.312  -0.281  -0.290 
[2.02]**  [2.07]**  [1.84]*  [1.90]* 
Percent of population with 
college degree or higher 
0.038  0.039  0.039  0.040 
[3.98]***  [3.97]***  [3.98]***  [3.96]*** 
Log patents per capita  -0.025  -0.023  -0.028  -0.027 
[0.58]  [0.53]  [0.64]  [0.62] 
State long-term capital gains tax 
rate 
0.344    -0.401   
[0.23]    [0.29]   
State income tax rate    -0.252    -0.736 
  [0.18]    [0.54] 
CSA is San Francisco/San Jose      1.242  1.243 
    [7.31]***  [7.88]*** 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2,256  2,256  2,256  2,256 
R-squared  0.74  0.74  0.75  0.75 
 
Sample consists of 2,256 CSA-Year observations for 197 CSAs where at least one venture capital investment has 
been made between 1975 and 2005.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of venture 
capital–backed portfolio companies in the CSA plus one receiving an initial investment in the current year.   
Geographic locations are assigned at the Combined Statistical Area (CSA) level.  In cases where a city is not located 
in a CSA, we assign venture capital offices in the city to the appropriate Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  Log 
Number of VC firms in CSA is the natural logarithm of the number of venture capital firm offices in the CSA in the 
current year.  Success rate of all VCs in CSA, past five years measures the percentage of all venture capital 
investments in the CSA over the past five years that led to an Initial Public Offering.    Log GSP per Capita is the 
natural logarithm of the state’s gross product per capita plus one in the previous year.  Percent of population with 
college degree or higher is the share of the state population that has graduated from college.  Log patents per capita 
is the number of patents per capita plus one issued in the state in the previous year.  State long-term capital gains tax 
rate and state income tax rate are average state marginal tax rates in the previous year. 
  
Standard errors are clustered at the CSA-level.  Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table VIII.  Comparison of Venture Capital Investment Success Rates by Type of Investment and Portfolio Company Location    
   All investments:     Companies in VC Centers:     Companies outside VC Centers: 




















of Difference          
Main Office Investment                       
Success Rate  0.154  0.115  ***    0.154  --  --    --  0.115  -- 
% Deals  41.31  21.55      64.92  --      --  33.04   
Branch Office  Investment                       
Success Rate  0.212  0.152  ***    0.225  0.160  ***    0.151  0.124   
% Deals  10.20  17.41      13.11  38.13      5.11  6.36   
Outside Investment                       
Success Rate  0.193  0.137  ***    0.197  0.131  ***    0.192  0.140  *** 
% Deals  48.50  61.04      21.98  61.87      94.89  60.60   
All Deals                       
Success Rate  0.179  0.135  ***    0.173  0.142  ***    0.190  0.131  *** 
Number  18,888  9,546        12,018  3,320        6,870  6,226    
                               
   Early Stage investments:     Late Stage investments:         














       
             
Main Office Investment                        
Success Rate  0.136  0.103  ***    0.177  0.133  ***         
% Deals  46.39  26.46      36.07  16.72           
Branch Office  Investment                       
Success Rate  0.196  0.129  ***    0.227  0.175  ***         
% Deals  9.76  17.69      10.64  17.14           
Outside Investment                       
Success Rate  0.158  0.112  ***    0.224  0.158  ***         
% Deals  43.85  55.85      53.29  66.14           
All Deals                       
Success Rate  0.151  0.113  ***    0.207  0.157  ***         
Number  9,586  4,732        9,302  4,814            
Sample consists of 28,434 venture capital investments in 14,006 portfolio companies for 2,039 venture capital firms between 1975 and 2005.  Main office investment is defined as 
a portfolio company investment in a CSA in which the investing venture capital firm has its main office.  Branch office investment is defined as a portfolio company investment in 
a CSA in which the investing venture capital firm has a branch office.  Outside investment is defined as a portfolio company investment in a CSA in which the investing venture 
capital firm does not have its main office or a branch office.  Success Rate equals the percentage of investments that led to an Initial Public Offering (IPO).  % Deals equals the 
percentage of deals that are main office investments, branch office investments, or outside investments.  VC centers are defined as San Francisco/San Jose, New York, and Boston.   
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table IX. Summary Statistics for Factors Associated with Venture Capital Investment Success 
   Investment Type     Investment Type Differences    





Outside    [1] vs. [2]  [1] vs. [3]  [2] vs. [3]   
Variable  mean  s.d.  mean  s.d.  mean  s.d.    Diff.  Sig.  Diff.  Sig.  Diff.  Sig.    mean  s.d. 
Success Rates                                     
Success  0.145  0.352  0.176  0.381  0.175  0.380    -0.030  ***  -0.029  ***  0.001      0.164  0.370 
Firm Characteristics                                 
Adjusted VC firm experience  0.475  1.106  0.938  0.972  0.418  1.113    -0.463  ***  0.057  ***  0.520  ***    0.484  1.112 
Venture Capital Firm based in VC 
Center  0.793  0.405  0.575  0.494  0.604  0.489    0.218  ***  0.189  ***  -0.029  ***    0.664  0.472 
Investment Characteristics                                 
Stage                                 
     Initial investment in first round  0.566  0.496  0.445  0.497  0.479  0.500    0.121  ***  0.088  ***  -0.033  ***    0.507  0.500 
     Initial investment in second round  0.186  0.389  0.211  0.408  0.189  0.392    -0.025  ***  -0.004    0.022  **    0.190  0.392 
     Initial investment in third round  0.099  0.298  0.147  0.354  0.119  0.324    -0.048  ***  -0.020  ***  0.028  ***    0.114  0.318 
     Initial investment in fourth round or later  0.131  0.337  0.180  0.384  0.188  0.390    -0.049  ***  -0.057  ***  -0.008      0.167  0.373 
Industry                                 
     Computers and Internet  0.504  0.500  0.466  0.499  0.420  0.493    0.038  ***  0.084  ***  0.046  ***    0.453  0.498 
     Communications  0.184  0.387  0.235  0.424  0.162  0.369    -0.051  ***  0.022  ***  0.073  ***    0.176  0.380 
     Business and Industrial  0.018  0.132  0.016  0.126  0.021  0.144    0.002    -0.003  *  -0.005      0.020  0.139 
     Consumer  0.047  0.211  0.031  0.173  0.059  0.236    0.016  ***  -0.013  ***  -0.028  ***    0.053  0.223 
     Energy  0.038  0.191  0.036  0.187  0.043  0.204    0.001    -0.006  **  -0.007      0.041  0.198 
     Biotech and Health Care  0.170  0.376  0.176  0.381  0.244  0.429    -0.006    -0.074  ***  -0.068  ***    0.213  0.409 
     Financial Services  0.018  0.134  0.021  0.142  0.024  0.153    -0.002    -0.006  ***  -0.003      0.022  0.146 
     Business Services  0.012  0.109  0.011  0.103  0.015  0.122    0.001    -0.003  **  -0.004      0.014  0.116 
     Other  0.009  0.097  0.009  0.092  0.011  0.106     0.001     -0.002     -0.003        0.010  0.102 
Number of Observations  9,948  2,227  16,076                          28,434 
 
Sample consists of 28,434 venture capital investments between 1975 and 2005.  Main office investment is defined as a portfolio company investment in a CSA in which the 
investing venture capital firm has its main office.  Branch office investment is defined as a portfolio company investment in a CSA in which the investing venture capital firm has a 
branch office.  Outside investment is defined as a portfolio company investment in a CSA in which the investing venture capital firm does not have its main office or a branch 
office.  Success is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the investment led to an Initial Public Offering.  Adjusted VC firm experience is equal to the log of one plus the 
number of previous investments made by the venture capital firm minus the log of one plus the number of prior investments the average venture capital investor has made as of the 
year in question.  Venture Capital Firm based in VC Center is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the investing venture capital firm is based in San Francisco/San 
Jose, New York, or Boston and zero otherwise.  Initial investment round variables are indicators that report the initial round in which the venture capital firm made an investment 
in the portfolio company.  Industry variables are indicators that report which of the nine major industries identified by Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2008) the 
portfolio company is classified under. 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 40 
 
Table X. Factors Associated with Venture Capital Investment Success 
   Success, IPO 
  Probit 
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
Portfolio company outside VC's office CSAs  0.0221  0.0222  0.0029  -0.0013  0.0004 
[4.44]***  [4.44]***  [0.30]  [0.13]  [0.04] 
Portfolio company in CSA of VC's branch office  0.0231  0.0232  0.0049  0.0016  0.0037 
[2.74]***  [2.75]***  [0.32]  [0.11]  [0.24] 
Adjusted VC firm experience  0.0099  0.0091  0.0092  0.0089  0.0091 
[4.99]***  [2.52]**  [2.55]**  [2.45]**  [2.52]** 
VC based in VC Center  0.0313  0.0311  0.0100  0.0069  0.0087 
[6.80]***  [6.66]***  [0.97]  [0.67]  [0.82] 
VC based in VC Center * Adjusted VC Firm Experience    0.0012  0.0011  0.0014  0.0012 
  [0.29]  [0.26]  [0.33]  [0.28] 
VC based in VC Center * Portfolio company outside VC's office 
CSAs 
    0.0293  0.0323  0.0305 
    [2.42]**  [2.66]***  [2.49]** 
VC based in VC Center * Portfolio company in CSA of VC's branch 
office 
    0.0206  0.0239  0.0219 
    [1.09]  [1.26]  [1.16] 
One or more investment in the CSA in the two years before or after 
the date of investment 
      -0.0209   
      [3.05]***   
One or more local investor in syndicate          -0.0041 
        [0.66] 
Includes year controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Includes round controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Includes portfolio company location controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Includes industry controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  28,434  28,434  28,434  28,434  28,434 
 
Sample consists of 28,434 venture capital investments between 1975 and 2005.  The dependent variable is Success an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the 
portfolio company went public and zero otherwise.  Portfolio Company outside VC's office CSAs is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the portfolio company 
receiving investment is located in a CSA in which the venture capital firm does not have its main office or a branch office and zero otherwise.  Portfolio Company in CSA of VC's 
branch office is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the portfolio company receiving investment is located in a CSA in which the venture capital firm has a branch 
office and zero otherwise.  The omitted investment type category is Portfolio Company in CSA of VC's main office.  This category includes all deals in which the portfolio 
company receiving investment is located in a CSA in which the venture capital firm's main office is located.  Adjusted VC firm experience is equal to the log of one plus the 
number of previous investments made by the venture capital firm minus the log of one plus the number of prior investments the average venture capital investor has made as of the 
year in question.  VC based in VC Center is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the investing venture capital firm is based in San Francisco/San Jose, New York, or 
Boston.  One or more investment in the CSA in the two years before or after the date of investment is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the venture capital firm has 
made one or more investments in the CSA in the two years before or after the date of investment.  One or more local investor in syndicate is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one if one or more of the venture capital firms investing in the portfolio company is local to the portfolio company. 
 
 Robust z-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.41 
 
Table XI. Factors Associated with Venture Capital Investment Success, Early Stage Investments 
   Success, IPO 
  Probit 
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
Portfolio company outside VC's office CSAs  0.0154  0.0155  -0.0069  -0.0107  -0.0091 
[2.61]***  [2.63]***  [0.63]  [0.95]  [0.76] 
Portfolio company in CSA of VC's branch office  0.0245  0.0247  -0.0125  -0.0150  -0.0142 
[2.40]**  [2.42]**  [0.71]  [0.86]  [0.81] 
Adjusted VC firm experience  0.0072  0.0051  0.0064  0.0063  0.0066 
[2.82]***  [1.13]  [1.40]  [1.36]  [1.43] 
VC based in VC Center  0.0144  0.0140  -0.0128  -0.0155  -0.0115 
[2.46]**  [2.37]**  [1.03]  [1.23]  [0.91] 
VC based in VC Center * Adjusted VC Firm Experience    0.0030  0.0015  0.0016  0.0017 
  [0.56]  [0.27]  [0.30]  [0.31] 
VC based in VC Center * Portfolio company outside VC's office 
CSAs 
    0.0350  0.0381  0.0327 
    [2.35]**  [2.54]**  [2.19]** 
VC based in VC Center * Portfolio company in CSA of VC's branch 
office 
    0.0545  0.0583  0.0524 
    [2.14]**  [2.26]**  [2.06]** 
One or more investment in the CSA in the two years before or after 
the date of investment 
      -0.0169   
      [1.92]*   
One or more local investor in syndicate          0.0015 
        [0.20] 
Includes year controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Includes round controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Includes portfolio company location controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Includes industry controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  14,043  14,043  14,043  14,043  14,043 
Sample consists of 14,043 early stage venture capital investments between 1975 and 2005.  Early stage investments are investments in portfolio companies that are developing 
their product or have begun initial marketing, manufacturing, and sales activities for their product.  The dependent variable is Success an indicator variable that takes on the value 
of one if the portfolio company went public and zero otherwise.  Portfolio Company outside VC's office CSAs is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the portfolio 
company receiving investment is located in a CSA in which the venture capital firm does not have its main office or a branch office and zero otherwise.  Portfolio Company in CSA 
of VC's branch office is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the portfolio company receiving investment is located in a CSA in which the venture capital firm has a 
branch office and zero otherwise.  The omitted investment type category is Portfolio Company in CSA of VC's main office.  This category includes all deals in which the portfolio 
company receiving investment is located in a CSA in which the venture capital firm's main office is located.  Adjusted VC firm experience is equal to the log of one plus the 
number of previous investments made by the venture capital firm minus the log of one plus the number of prior investments the average venture capital investor has made as of the 
year in question.  VC based in VC Center is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the investing venture capital firm is based in San Francisco/San Jose, New York, or 
Boston.  One or more investment in the CSA in the two years before or after the date of investment is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the venture capital firm has 
made one or more investments in the CSA in the two years before or after the date of investment.  One or more local investor in syndicate is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one if one or more of the venture capital firms investing in the portfolio company is local to the portfolio company.  
 
 Robust z-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 